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Abstract
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1 Introduction
A number of authors [2,12,15,18] have recently shown how abstract interpre-
tations of program control ﬂow can be extracted from higher-order programs,
via the use of type eﬀect systems. In these works, the type eﬀects predict
atomic events, and the order in which they occur. In all of these systems ex-
cept [12], the eﬀects form simple labeled transition systems (LTSs) on which
standard model-checking algorithms can apply to relate abstracted programs
with speciﬁcations. Such a program analysis allows for automatic static veriﬁ-
cation of program properties, including resource usage analysis [15] and access
control [18].
The terminology we use in [18] is to speak of histories, denoted η, which
are traces of atomic events. Events are records of some program action, ex-
plicitly inserted into program code either manually (by the programmer) or
automatically (by the compiler). Events are intended to be suﬃciently ab-
stract to represent a variety of program actions—e.g. opening a ﬁle, access
control privilege activation, or entry to or exit from critical regions. Histories
maintain the ordered sequences of events that occur during program execu-
tion. We deﬁne in [18] a type eﬀect system that produces types with history
eﬀects that are abstract interpretations of program histories. More specif-
ically, history eﬀects are a form of LTS; if a program is statically assigned
a history eﬀect, that eﬀect’s interpretation conservatively approximates the
event history that can be dynamically generated by the program. A simple
example of a history eﬀect in our grammar is:
µh.ev[1]|(ev[2]; h; ev[3])
This is the eﬀect of a recursive function with a base case generating atomic
event ev[1], and the recursive case generating ev[2] before the recursive call
and ev[3] after.
1.1 The FJ
sec
language model
While the aforecited works were developed for core functional languages, in [16]
we extended the results of [18] to Featherweight Java (FJ) [13], showing how
the same ideas can be generalized to an object-oriented setting, with special
care to handle the case of dynamic dispatch. The language model, called FJsec,
is FJ extended with event histories and a logic of program checks.
The syntax of FJsec includes events ev[i], indexed by identiﬁers i. The
semantics of FJsec is deﬁned via a reduction relation → on conﬁgurations,
which are pairs of histories and expressions (η, e). The reduction relation
speciﬁes that events encountered during execution are placed at the rightmost,
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or “most recent”, end of the history in the current conﬁguration, i.e. (where ()
is the FJsec unit value):
η, ev[i] → (η; ev[i]), ()
So for example, if a method format is a component of an applet, the beginning
of the method can be labeled with an Applet event, and so record on the
program history that an applet has aﬀected the program control ﬂow when
the method is invoked:
String format(String text){ ev[Applet]; . . . }
A type eﬀect analysis is deﬁned in [16], that statically approximates the his-
tories generated by FJsec programs.
1.2 Related Work
The idea of using some form of abstract program interpretation as input to
model checking [19] for veriﬁcation of speciﬁed program properties has been
explored by many authors, including [7,3,5]. In these particular works, the
speciﬁcations are temporal logics, regular languages, or ﬁnite automata, and
the abstract control ﬂow is extracted as an LTS in the form of a ﬁnite automa-
ton, grammar, or push-down automata. However, none of these works deﬁnes
a rigorous process for extracting an LTS from higher-order programs.
Perhaps the most closely related work is [15], which proposes a similar type
and eﬀect system and type inference algorithm, but their “resource usage”
abstraction is of a markedly diﬀerent character, based on grammars rather
than LTSs. Their system also lacks parametric polymorphism, which restricts
expressiveness in practice.
The system of [12] is based on linear types, which are related to, but dif-
ferent from, eﬀect types. Their usages U are similar to our history eﬀects
H , but the usages have a much more complex grammar, and do not appear
amenable to model-checking. The systems in [8,4,14,5] use LTSs extracted
from control-ﬂow graph abstractions to model-check program security prop-
erties expressed in temporal logic. Their approach is close in several respects,
but we are primarily focused on the programming language as opposed to the
model-checking side of the problem. Their analyses assume the pre-existence
of a control-ﬂow graph abstraction, which is in the format for a ﬁrst-order
program analysis only. Our type-based approach is deﬁned directly at the
language level, and type inference provides an explicit, scalable mechanism for
extracting an abstract program interpretation, which is applicable to object
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oriented features. Also, none of this related work considers the transforma-
tions discussed in Sect. 3.
1.3 Outline of the paper
In this extended abstract we focus on transformations of FJsec history eﬀects,
showing how they can be useful. First, we deﬁne a simple stack transforma-
tion called stackiﬁcation to generate an abstract interpretation of the possible
stack states at runtime. This transformation is particularly useful for security
analyses such as Java stack inspection [20]. Then, we show how exceptions
can be interpreted by another transformation called exnization. A principal
beneﬁt of our approach is that a variety of language features can be treated
in a modular fashion, without redeﬁnition of type eﬀect inference.
2 Automatic Program Abstraction via Type and Eﬀect
Our program analysis is a type and eﬀect inference system, where eﬀects
are approximations of program histories. This approach allows sophisticated
type inference techniques to be applied, e.g. constraint-based polymorphic
subtyping. This expressiveness has beneﬁts in higher-order functional [18] and
object-oriented settings [16]; the latter has a more complete discussion of the
type inference system presented here, and its beneﬁts for Java in particular.
2.1 History Eﬀects
The eﬀects component of our type system, called history eﬀects, are essen-
tially label transition systems (LTSs), similar to basic process algebras (BPAs)
[6]. Label transition systems generate possibly inﬁnite strings called traces
via a transition relation, wherein transitions are labeled (possibly by the
empty string ); sequences of transitions generate traces of labels. A his-
tory eﬀect H may be an event ev[i], or a sequence of history eﬀects H1; H2, a
nondeterministic choice of history eﬀects H1|H2, or a recursive history eﬀect
µh.H, where the variable h is recursively bound in H. So for example, letting
H  µh.ev[1] | (ev[2]; h):
H

−→ ev[1]|(ev[2]; H)

−→ ev[2]; H
ev[2]
−−→ H

−→ ev[1]|(ev[2]; H)

−→ ev[1]
ev[1]
−−→ 
which yields the trace (ev[2] ev[1]). The interpretation of any H, denoted H,
is the set of traces that can be so generated. The eﬀects reconstructed by type
inference serve as an approximation of run-time histories, in the sense that if H
is the eﬀect statically assigned to a program e, and , e→ η, e′, then η ∈ H.
This property is formalized in Theorem 2.1.
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Sound eﬀect approximations in this sense are obtained from programs via
type and eﬀect inference, which has three distinct phases: (1) type and eﬀect
constraint inference, (2) constraint closure, and (3) eﬀect extraction, where
top-level program eﬀects are obtained as a solution to eﬀect constraints gen-
erated by the previous phases. We discuss each of these phases in turn.
2.1.1 Type constraint inference.
Featherweight Java is equipped with a declarative, nominal type system; the
type language is based on class names, which annotate function return and ar-
gument types, casts, and object creation points. The system is algorithmically
checkable, and enjoys a type safety result [13]. Our system is not intended to
redo the type system of FJ, but to “superimpose” a type and eﬀect analysis
on it, thereby subsuming type safety for the FJ subset of FJsec. This super-
imposition is conservative and transparent to the programmer, both for ease
of use, and for backwards compatibility with Java.
Our language of types includes class types [T¯ C], where T¯ is a vector of ﬁeld
and method types in the class, and C is the class name. Methods types are
of the form T¯
H
−→ T, where H is an approximation of the event histories that
a method can generate. The latter may be abstract, so that polymorphism
extends to eﬀects. For example, if we assume that C and D are deﬁned classes,
the latter containing a single nullary method n, and given the following method
deﬁnition, where we assume the trivial addition of a sequencing construct to
the language:
C m(D f){ev[1]; f.n(); return this.m(f)}
the following polymorphic type can be assigned to m (where the details of the
types T and S are irrelevant to the example):
m : ∀h.[(n : ()
h
−→ S) D]
µh′.ev[1];h;h′
−−−−−−−→ [T C]
Polymorphism on method eﬀects is quite useful, since Java allows objects in
subclasses of D to be actual parameters of m; without polymorphism, this disci-
pline would require equivalence of eﬀects throughout the inheritance hierarchy,
or some sort of behavioral subtyping with regard to events, which is unrealistic.
For example, if events represent privilege authorizations, the least privileged
member of a class hierarchy would determine the authorization level of every
class in the hierarchy, and any extension of the class hierarchy would require
re-computation of superclass types. This issue is discussed more thoroughly
in [16].
Our inference system reconstructs type and eﬀect constraints of the form
S<: T; constraint sets are represented as conjunctions of these atomic con-
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straints. The relation is deﬁned with respect to the inheritance hierarchy in
the same manner as [13], and with respect to histories as a containment re-
lation; in particular, if H1 and H2 are closed, then H1 <: H2 iﬀ H1 ⊆ H2.
Constraints on method and class types are deﬁned in a familiar manner [9,16],
modulo constraints on the latters’ history eﬀect annotations. Typings are re-
constructed via an algorithmic derivation systems on judgements of the form
Γ, C, H W e : T, where Γ is a type environment, H is the eﬀect of e, T is
the type of e given Γ, and C imposes constraints on type variables in the
judgement. Thus, where mtype(m, C) returns the annotated type of m in the
deﬁnition of C, the rule T-Invk reconstructs the type of method invocations:
T-Invk
Γ, C, H W e : [T C]
Γ, D, H′ W e¯ : ¯[S B] mtype(m, C) = D¯→ D B¯<: D¯
Γ, C ∧D ∧ T<: (m : ¯[S B]
h
−→ [t D]), H; H′; h W e.m(e¯) : [t D]
Note that a left-to-right, call-by-value evaluation order is reﬂected in the se-
quencing of eﬀects of subexpressions in the consequent.
2.1.2 Constraint closure and consistency.
In addition to type inference rules, the type implementation comprises a con-
straint closure algorithm, called close, and a consistency check. A constraint
is consistent if it contains no contradictions, i.e. it possesses a solution in a
regular tree model [16]. Closure normalizes constraints, essentially by “break-
ing down” given constraints to discover all implicitly represented constraints
of “basic” form. For example:
given: T¯
H
−→ T<: S¯
H
′
−→ S closure adds: S¯<: T¯ ∧ T<: S ∧ H<: H′
Note that in particular, closure explicitly accrues all eﬀect constraints. Once
constraints are broken down in this manner, it is straightforward to check
consistency.
2.1.3 History eﬀect extraction.
Another beneﬁt of closure, noted above, is that it generates a constraint that
is amenable to history eﬀect extraction, since all eﬀect constraints are explicit
in closed constraints. In particular, any expression’s top-level history eﬀect
can be extracted from the constraint system inferred for the expression via the
hextract algorithm. It is demonstrable that inferred history eﬀect constraints
deﬁne a system of lower bounds on history eﬀect variables; the hextract al-
gorithm exploits this property to obtain a least solution of each constrained
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; H→simp H H;  →simp H
H1 →simp H
′
1
H1; H2 →simp H
′
1; H2
H2 →simp H
′
2
H1; H2 →simp H1; H
′
2
H|H→simp H
H1 →simp H
′
1
H1|H2 →simp H
′
1|H2
H2 →simp H
′
2
H1|H2 →simp H1|H
′
2
h ∈ fv(H)
µh.H→simp H
Fig. 1. Eﬀect simpliﬁcation rewrite rules
variable, as the join of its lower bounds.
Soundness of the complete automated analysis is then obtained by correct-
ness of each phase; in the current context, our principal result is as follows:
Theorem 2.1 If , e→ η, e′, and Γ, C, H W e : T is derivable with close(C)
consistent, then η ∈ hextract(H, close(C)).
3 Eﬀect Transformations for Flexibility
In this section we observe that a beneﬁt of our type and eﬀect inference ap-
proach is that it yields abstract program interpretations, in the form of his-
tory eﬀects, that are amenable to transformational techniques for ﬂexibility of
analysis. These transformations can be used to post-process inferred eﬀects,
without requiring any reworking of the inference component of analysis. This
means that certain extensions of the language can be treated statically in a
modular fashion.
One obvious transformation is a simpliﬁcation transformation, based on
equivalences induced by the interpretation of eﬀects discussed in Sect. 2.1,
deﬁned in Fig. 1 as a set of eﬀect rewrite rules. The beneﬁt of this trans-
formation is reduced size and complexity of eﬀects for model checking. More
complicated are the stackiﬁcation and exnization transformations considered
in detail below. Stackiﬁcation is useful in a stack-based safety context– that
is, where events associated with function activations are “forgotten” when that
activation returns, as in e.g. Java stack inspection. Exnization implements the
impact of exceptions on eﬀect representations.
3.1 Stack-Based Transformations for Security
Rather than consistently accruing events in a history, a stack-based model
can be deﬁned where events generated by method activations are associated
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R-Invk
mbody(m, C) = x¯.e
ς, (new C(v¯)).m(u¯) → ς :: , ·[u¯/x¯, new C(v¯)/this]e·
R-Event
ς :: η, ev[i] → ς :: η; ev[i], ()
R-Pop
ς :: η, E[·v·] → ς, E[v]
Fig. 2. The stack-based semantics of FJstack
with the activation call-stack frame; when the activation is popped, so are
the associated events. The Java stack inspection [11] access control mecha-
nism, for example, is based on sequences of events on the call stack. There
are other stack-based properties that are of interest in program analysis, and
so in general an abstraction of the possible call stacks is a useful property.
A stack-based access control model has additionally been combined with a
history-based security mechanism in [1], and a static analysis for enforcing
general stack-based properties via temporal logic is presented in [5]. Direct
type inference for a stack-based security model has been studied previously,
e.g. in [17]; however, since security mechanisms such as that proposed in [1] re-
quire both a history- and stack-based perspective, we believe that our uniform
approach is simpler, hence more eﬃcient, than e.g. combining direct stack- and
history-based inference in such a context.
In this section, we observe that a stack-based security model can be stat-
ically enforced, not by redeﬁning the inference system discussed in Sect. 2,
but by an eﬀect post-processing technique called stackiﬁcation. Stackiﬁcation
takes as input an eﬀect that predicts the history generated by a program, and
returns the stack contexts generated by a program. The stack contexts gener-
ated by a program are formalized by reﬁguring the FJsec operational semantics
with regard to stacks, rather than histories, yielding the language model we
call FJstack. Stack contexts maintain a notion of ordering; hence stacks, which
we denote ς, are LIFO sequences of histories, and are either nil or constructed
with a cons operator (::):
ς ::= nil | ς :: η history stacks
The FJstack source language is identical to FJsec, except that “framed” ex-
pressions ·e· are included, to delimit regions of code associated with a stack
frame. Stack frames are associated with activations in keeping with the stan-
dard stack-based model. It is also notationally convenient to deﬁne a syntactic
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stackify() = 
stackify(; H) = stackify(H)
stackify(ev[i]; H) = ev[i]; stackify(H)
stackify(h; H) = h|stackify(H)
stackify((µh.H1); H2) = (µh.stackify(H1)) | stackify(H2)
stackify((H1|H2); H) = stackify(H1; H) | stackify(H2; H)
stackify((H1; H2); H3) = stackify(H1; (H2; H3))
stackify(H) = stackify(H; )
Fig. 3. The stackify algorithm
notion of evaluation contexts:
E ::= [ ] | E.f | E.m(e¯) | v.m(v¯, E, e¯) | new C(v¯, E, e¯) | (C)E | ·E·
Thus, in the operational semantics deﬁned in Fig. 2, the rule governing method
invocation, R-Invk, will push a new frame on the stack, and delimit the code
region associated with the activation. Frames are popped, as in R-Pop, when
activations return the result of evaluation. Events are accrued in order within
an activation frame, as in R-Event.
Given this model, a static analysis in FJstack will approximate the stack
contexts that can be generated during program execution. As mentioned
above, we accomplish this by a stackify transformation, which takes as in-
put history eﬀects output by FJsec type inference, which is also applicable to
FJstack source programs (framed expressions are only generated at run-time).
A phenomenon exploited by our transformation is that the scope of inferred
method eﬀects is always delimited by a µ-binding. This is because the hextract
algorithm will resolve any history eﬀect variable h as a µ-bound eﬀect, and
every method is assigned a variable h as its eﬀect during inference. In other
words, stack “pushes” and “pops” are implicitly recorded during inference as
the beginning and end of µ-scope.
This means that stackify , deﬁned in Fig. 3, can use the syntax of eﬀects to
recognize corresponding pushes and pops. Note that in the transformation of
µ-bound eﬀects, any eﬀects H2 following a µ-bound eﬀect H1 will be considered
as part of a diﬀerent stack context, since H1 is associated with an activation
that will be pushed and popped before any events predicted by H2 can occur.
Note also that this technique requires that simpliﬁcations in Fig. 1 only be
applied post-stackiﬁcation, lest they eliminate µ-bindings.
C. Skalka et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 131 (2005) 111–124 119
R-Throw
η, E[throw] → η, throw
RC-Try
η, e1 → η
′, e′1
η, try{e1}catch{e2} → η, try{e
′
1}catch{e2}
R-Try
v = throw
η, try{v}catch{e2} → η, v
R-Catch
η, try{throw}catch{e2} → η, e2
Fig. 4. Semantics of exceptions
The stackify algorithm generally exploits a normal form representation of
eﬀects as a sequence H1; H2. The last three clauses use history eﬀect equalities
to massage history eﬀects into this normal form. Observe that the range of
stackify consists of history eﬀects that are all tail-recursive; stacks are therefore
ﬁnite-state transition systems and more eﬃcient model-checking algorithms
are possible for stacks than for general histories [10].
Example 3.1 With a, b, c, d representing arbitrary events (NB : the output of
stackify in this example is simpliﬁed and rearranged for readability):
stackify(a; (µ.h.b; c); (µh.c; (|(d; h; a)))) = a; ((µh.b; c)|(µh.c; (|(d; h)|(d; a))))
3.2 A Transformation for Exceptions
Exceptions exist in Java, so a realistic application of our approach must ac-
count for them. In this section we consider a ﬁrst approximation of the full
exception feature set, where we assume there exists only one anonymous excep-
tion in the language. The FJsec language of expressions is extended to include
the form throw for throwing this anonymous exception, and to include the
form try{e1}catch{e2} for handling thrown exceptions. The expressions e1
and e2 are expected to agree in their type annotations. The semantics of
FJsec are extended with the rules in Fig. 4, where evaluation contexts E are as
deﬁned in Sect. 2, less the form ·E·.
To treat these new language forms in type inference, we introduce two new
“pre-history” forms to the language of eﬀects: throw to identify control ﬂow
points where an exception is thrown, and H1 H2 to represent the eﬀect of han-
dlers, where H1 represents the eﬀect of the try clause, and H2 represents the
eﬀect of the catch clause. We call these pre-history forms, because our eﬀect
transformation will eliminate them by replacing them with a direct represen-
tation of their control ﬂow. They are not endowed with an LTS semantics,
but merely serve as placeholders for this transformation. We extend the FJsec
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T-Throw
Γ, true, throw W throw : t
T-TryCatch
Γ, C, H1 W e1 : [T C] Γ, D, H2 W e2 : [S C]
Γ, C ∧D ∧ S<: t ∧ T<: t, H1H2 W try{e1}catch{e2} : [t C]
Fig. 5. Type inference rules for exceptions
exnize() = {} ,∅,∅
exnize(ev[i]) = {ev[i]} ,∅,∅
exnize(throw) = ∅, {} ,∅
exnize(h) = {h} ,∅, {h}
exnize(H1|H2) = let s1, t1, r1 = exnize(H1) in
let s2, t2, r2 = exnize(H2) in
s1 ∪ s2, t1 ∪ t2, r1 ∪ r2
exnize(H1; H2) = let s1, t1, r1 = exnize(H1) in
let s2, t2, r2 = exnize(H2) in
s1; s2, t1 ∪ (s1; t2), r1 ∪ (s1; r2)
exnize(H1 H2) = let s1, t1, r1 = exnize(H1) in
let s2, t2, r2 = exnize(H2) in
s1 ∪ (t1; s2), t1; t2, r1 ∪ (t1; r2)
exnize(µh.H) = let s, t, r = exnize(H) in
let Hs = µh.join(s) in
let r′ = map (λ(H, h′) . H[Hs/h]; h
′) r in
let rh = ﬁlter (λ(H; h
′) . h′ = h) r′ in
let t′ = map (λH . µh.join({H[Hs/h]} ∪ rh)) t in
{Hs} , t
′, r′ − rh
Fig. 6. The exception transformation function exnize
type inference system with the rules speciﬁed in Fig. 5, to assign these new
eﬀect forms to the language extensions for exceptions. All other components
of type inference remain unchanged.
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In the post-processing of inferred eﬀects, called exnization, the impact of
exceptions on control ﬂow needs to be discovered. To accomplish this, the ex-
ception transformation classiﬁes eﬀect paths into three categories; safe paths,
throw paths, and precursors. Safe paths do not encounter a throw, whereas
throw paths are terminated by a throw. Precursors are safe paths that end in
a variable (tail recursive paths); they may be “pruned back” from other paths
(safe, throw, or recursive), since if a recursive call causes a throw, everything
after the call with be short-circuited until the ﬁrst enclosing handler. The idea
is that precursors should be joined with throw paths within a µ-binding, since
any number of recursive calls can be made before a throw is encountered; this
yields µ-bound throw paths. For example, given:
H  µh.ev[1]|(ev[2]; h; ev[3])|(ev[4]; throw; ev[5])
we yield the following safe and throw paths obtained from H:
safe: µh.ev[1]|(ev[2]; h; ev[3]) throw: µh.ev[4]|(ev[2]; h)
An added complication is that recursive calls h may precede other tail recur-
sions or throws in recursive or throw paths; the analysis replaces these “inner”
recursions with the safe recursive call paths of h, to obtain safe preceding
ground paths.
In more detail, the algorithm exnize, deﬁned in Fig. 6, returns a triple
s, t, r, where s are the safe paths, t are the throw paths, and r are the pre-
cursors, each represented as history eﬀect sets. The exception transformation
is deﬁned via some auxiliary functions, including map and ﬁlter deﬁned as
usual (where the latter accepts only values that match the given predicate),
as well as a cartesian product operation for sequencing pairs of sets, and a
join operation deﬁned on non-empty sets:
s1; s2 = {H1; H2 | H1 ∈ s1 and H2 ∈ s2}
join({H}) = H
join({H} ∪ s) = H|join(s)
The idea is that at the top-level, the exception transformation is the join of
the deduced safe and throw paths; note also that at the top-level, the set of
precursors should be empty. Thus, the exception transformation of an eﬀect
H is implemented as:
let s, t,∅ = exnize(H) in join(s ∪ t)
For brevity, we have excluded a special subcase of exnize(µt.H), where the
recursive call exnize(H) returns s, t, r such that s = ∅. However, this is the
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case where every program control path through a function throws an exception,
which we believe will be rare, and can be easily dealt with by modifying the
case where s is not empty.
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